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In	   recent	   years,	   a	   considerable	   debate	   on	   the	   present	   and	   future	   of	   economics	   has	   involved	   (mainly	  
heterodox)	   economists,	   methodologists	   and	   historians	   of	   economic	   thought.	   The	   appearance	   of	   new	  
strands	  of	  inquiry,	  innovative	  techniques	  of	  investigation,	  and	  unprecedented	  patterns	  of	  cooperation	  with	  
other	  social	  sciences	  has	  stimulated	  the	  need	  to	  discuss	  the	  possible	  evolution	  of	  the	  discipline.	  Attention	  
has	  concentrated	  in	  particular	  on	  the	  current	  state	  of	  fragmentation	  of	  the	  discipline.	  This	  fragmentation	  is	  
not	  simply	  due	  to	  the	  opening	  of	  new	  areas	  of	  investigation	  and	  the	  resulting	  emergence	  of	  new	  domains	  
(such	   as	   experimental	   economics,	   behavioral	   economics,	   complexity	   economics	   and	   neuroeconomics,	   to	  
mention	  only	  some):	  it	  instead	  appears	  to	  be	  the	  byproduct	  of	  more	  profound	  changes	  in	  the	  discipline.	  Far	  
from	  representing	  a	  purely	  taxonomic	  problem,	  therefore,	  the	  growing	  number	  of	  economics	  sub-­‐fields	  or	  
approaches	  is	  raising	  questions	  about	  the	  foundations	  of	  the	  discipline,	  and	  it	  has	  inspired	  a	  not	  negligible	  
discussion	  which	  is,	  at	  the	  same	  time,	  at	  and	  on	  the	  margins	  of	  economics.	  	  
In	  sum,	  the	  received	  view	  of	  the	  economic	  discipline	  is	  under	  attack.	  In	  particular,	  the	  discussion	  concerns	  
the	   changing	   face	   of	   mainstream	   economics,	   the	   relationships	   between	   orthodox	   and	   heterodox	  
economics,	   the	   nature	   and	   consequences	   of	   a	   possible	   pluralist	   era	   in	   the	   discipline.	  While	   leaving	   the	  
citadels	  of	   their	   specializations	   to	  venture	   into	  such	  new	  realms,	  economists	  are	   forced	   to	   re-­‐discuss	   the	  
foundations	   of	   their	   discipline.	   This	   task	   requires	   competencies	   that,	   for	   a	   variety	   of	   historical	   reasons,	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economists	   seemingly	   do	   not	   possess.	   However,	   there	   is	   a	   strange	   breed	   of	   specialists	   –	   economic	  
methodologists	  –	  who	  focus	  in	  their	  work	  on	  the	  generality	  of	  the	  discourse	  on	  economics	  as	  science,	  so	  as	  
to	  be	  able	  to	  pose	  questions	  concerning	  both	  the	  epistemological	  and	  ontological	  dimensions	  of	  the	  current	  
fragmentation,	   while	   devoting	   specific	   attention	   to	   how	   economists	   “do”	   economics.	   Another,	   equally	  
strange	  breed	  of	  specialists,	  mainly	  interested	  in	  the	  evolution	  and	  diffusion	  of	  ideas	  over	  time	  –	  historians	  
of	  economic	  thought	  –,	  can	  perhaps	  attempt	  to	  untangle	  the	  reasons	  why	  a	  heretofore	  seemingly	  compact	  
discipline	  has	  fragmented,	  or	  better,	  work	  with	  this	  ultimate	  (and	  ultimately)	  impossible	  aim	  in	  mind.	  And,	  
joining	  together	  to	  pursue	  this	  common	  purpose,	  the	  two	  kinds	  of	  specialists	  might	  be	  able	  to	  identify	  the	  
origins	   of	   this	   fragmentation	   –	   one	   possible	   explanation	   being	   that	   fragmentation	   is,	   in	   truth,	   the	   (only	  
possible)	  foundation	  of	  today’s	  economics.	  	  
Aiming,	  in	  general,	  to	  promote	  and	  enhance	  the	  interest	  of	  economists	  in	  the	  history	  of	  economic	  thought	  
in	   their	   teaching	   and	   research	   activities,	   the	   Italian	   Association	   for	   the	   History	   of	   Political	   Economy	  
(STOREP)	   devoted	   its	   12th
	  
annual	   conference	   (University	   of	   Torino,	   June	   11-­‐13,	   2015),	   entitled	   “Shifting	  
Boundaries:	  Economics	   in	  the	  Crisis	  and	  the	  Challenge	  of	   Interdisciplinarity”,	  to	  exploring	  the	  relationship	  
between	  economics	  and	  other	  disciplines,	  especially,	  but	  not	  exclusively,	  in	  the	  recent	  history	  of	  economic	  
theory.	  This	  issue	  of	  History	  of	  Economic	  Ideas	  presents	  a	  selection	  of	  papers	  given	  at	  the	  conference,	  in	  the	  
hope	   that	   it	   may	   contribute	   to	   the	   current	   debates	   on	   the	   methods,	   foundations	   and	   prospects	   of	  
economic	  theory.	  
It	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  a	  scientific	  economic	  association	  and	  a	  journal	  specialized	  in	  the	  history	  of	  economic	  
thought	  have	  decided	   to	  address	   such	   issues.	  The	  history	  of	  a	  discipline	  provides	  a	  necessary	   theoretical	  
frame	  in	  which	  to	  understand	  how	  methods,	  problems,	  subjects,	  and	  techniques	  evolve	  over	  time,	  while	  in	  
principle,	   the	   approach	   used	   to	   investigate	   the	   past	   can	   be	   fruitfully	   employed	   to	   explore	   current	  
tendencies	   as	   well.	   “Present	   as	   history”	   is	   the	   expression,	   prevalently	   used	   in	   philosophy	   and	   historical	  
methodology,	   which	   synthesizes	   this	   perspective.	   History	   matters,	   in	   a	   double	   sense:	   besides	   being	  
evidently	   implied	   in	   the	  analysis	  of	  evolving	  economic	   theories,	   it	   is	  embedded	   in	   the	  series	  of	  economic	  
events	  which	  induce	  the	  revision	  theories	  hitherto	  considered	  to	  be	  well-­‐grounded.	  This	  is	  well	   illustrated	  
by	   Kirman’s	   2010	   article	   on	   the	   economic	   crisis	   as	   (also)	   a	   crisis	   for	   economic	   theory,	   showing	   that	   the	  
financial	  meltdown	  of	   2007-­‐8	   and	   its	   consequences	   cannot	  be	   explained	  by	   current	  macroeconomic	   and	  
financial	  mainstream	  models,	  with	  their	  unrealistic	  assumptions.	  Data	  and	  events	  are	  simply	  incompatible	  
with	  the	  idea	  that	  aggregate	  behaviour	  can	  be	  likened	  to	  that	  of	  a	  “rational”	  individual.	  Dynamic	  Stochastic	  
General	  Equilibrium	  “normal	  times”	  models,	  based	  on	  micro-­‐economic	  foundations,	  are	  structurally	  unable	  
to	   explain	   the	   fundamental	   features	   or	   even	   the	   occurrence	   of	   the	   crisis,	   whereas,	   Kirman	   argues,	   only	  
complexity	  approaches	  –	  which	  view	  the	  economy	  as	  a	  complex	  interactive	  and	  adaptive	  system	  –	  can	  help	  
accomplish	  this	  aim.	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Kirman’s	  arguments	  anticipate	  a	  number	  of	  questions	  regarding	  the	  relationships	  between	  the	  orthodoxy	  
and	  heterodoxy	  of	  the	  discipline,	  between	  its	  mainstream	  and	  the	  periphery,	  as	  well	  as	  between	  economics	  
and	   other	   sciences.	   However,	   some	   preliminary	   considerations	   about	   the	   use	   of	   historical	   and	  
methodological	   approaches	   to	   study	   the	   uncertain	   boundaries	   of	   economics	   can	   be	   of	   help	   before	  
beginning	  the	  analytical	   treatment	  of	  such	  topics.	  Owing	  to	  the	  rigidity	  seemingly	  embedded	   in	  the	  topic	  
itself	  –	  the	  idea	  of	  boundaries	  as	  constraints,	  or	  limits	  not	  to	  be	  trespassed	  but	  only	  extended	  –	  the	  issue	  of	  
the	   boundaries	   of	   the	   discipline	   has	   traditionally	   been	   regarded	   as	   a	   problem.	   Yet	   the	   current	   era	   of	  
fragmentation	   not	   only	   calls	   this	   rigidity	   into	   question,	   but	   also	   allows	   reformulation	   of	   the	   problem	   in	  
positive	   terms.	   In	  The	  Great	  Chain	  of	  Being,	  of	  1936,	  American	  philosopher	  Arthur	  O.	  Lovejoy	   introduced	  
the	   notion	   of	   the	   history	   of	   ideas	   as	   opposed	   to	   the	   history	   of	   philosophical	   systems.	   Some	   ideas,	   he	  
maintained,	  transcend	  and	  cross	  the	  boundaries	  of	  (however	  different)	  philosophical	  systems	  and	  schools	  
of	  thought.	  This	  distinctive	  perspective	  does	  not	  assert	  that	  systems	  of	  thought	  are	  always	  compatible	  by	  
reason	   of	   some	   shared	   ideas.	   Rather,	   it	   shows	   that	   certain	   concepts	   may	   constantly	   reappear	   in	   re-­‐
contextualized	  forms	  within	  the	  boundaries	  of	  systems	  of	  thought	  that	  may	  be	  radically	  different	  from	  the	  
one	   previously	   encapsulating	   those	   same	   concepts,	   and	   even	   compete	   with	   them	   for	   dominance.	   For	  
instance,	  one	  could	  argue	  that	  the	  notions	  of	  use-­‐value	  and	  exchange-­‐value	  characterize	  both	  classical	  and	  
Marxian	  economics,	  which	  evidently	  come	  to	  very	  different	  conclusions	  as	   to	   the	  values	  of	  commodities.	  
Nonetheless,	  these	  ideas	  delineate	  a	  conceptual	  horizon	  of	  an	  epoch	  of	  economic	  thought.	  And	  many	  other	  
examples	  can	  illustrate	  the	  problematics	  of	  the	  continuity/diversity	  of	  approaches	  in	  economics.	  	  
Consider	  Herbert	  Simon’s	  contribution	  on	  bounded	  rationality.	  Simon	  introduced	  the	  concept	  in	  connection	  
with	   artificial	   intelligence.	   This	   conferred	   a	   highly	   structured	   form	   on	   the	   notion	   itself,	   which	   was	  
consequently	  specified	  in	  terms	  of	  well-­‐defined	  symbolic	  operations.	  No	  room	  was	  left	  for	  ambiguities.	  But	  
bounded	  rationality	  was	  then	  re-­‐examined	  by	  James	  March,	  who	  on	  the	  contrary	  emphasized	  exactly	  the	  
ambiguity	   and	   inconsistency	   of	   preferences,	   and	   the	  weakness	   of	   structure	   in	   decisional	   processes.	   The	  
notion	  was	  then	  used	  by	  Oliver	  Williamson	  in	  relation	  to	  that	  of	  opportunism,	  although	  Simon	  claimed	  that	  
Williamson’s	  approach	  to	  rationality	  was	  enclosed	  in	  a	  neoclassical	  framework.	  Then	  came	  Richard	  Nelson	  
and	   Sidney	   Winter,	   who	   coupled	   bounded	   rationality	   with	   the	   concept	   of	   tacit	   knowledge	   in	   an	  
evolutionary	   theory	   of	   business	   behavior.	   In	   this	   context,	   tacit	   knowledge	   –	   knowledge	   that	   cannot	   be	  
made	  explicit	  –	  has	  to	  do	  with	  (and	  provides	  evidence	  of)	  insurmountable	  limits	  to	  rationality,	  in	  a	  view	  in	  
which	  rationality	   is	  connoted	  by	  automatic	  capabilities	  which	  reveal	  the	   limits	  of	  the	  conscious	  mind.	  But	  
Simon	  expressly	  criticized	  Michael	  Polanyi’s	  concept	  of	  tacit	  knowledge:	  consequently	  he	  did	  not	  use	  it	  to	  
explain	   bounded	   rationality.	   Daniel	   Kahneman	   and	   Amos	   Tversky	   employ	   Simon’s	   bounded	   rationality	  
without	   referring	   to	   his	   symbolic	   approach,	   and,	   on	   examining	   “fast	   and	   frugal”	   heuristics	   for	   making	  
decisions,	  Gerd	  Gigerenzer	  frames	  the	  concept	  of	  bounded	  rationality	  in	  relation	  to	  biological	  and	  adaptive	  
mechanisms,	   a	   view	   which	   does	   not	   resort	   to	   symbolic	   systems.	   However,	   although	   Simon	   is	   a	   major	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influence	  on	  Kahneman	  and	  Tversky,	  as	  well	  as	  on	  Gigerenzer	  and	  colleagues,	  the	  former	  maintain	  that	  the	  
use	  of	  heuristics	  is	  at	  the	  origin	  of	  systematic	  errors,	  while	  the	  latter	  suggest	  that	  simple	  heuristics	  lead	  to	  
reasonable	   and	   accurate	   inferences.	   This	   shows,	   in	   sum,	   that	   the	   concept	   of	   bounded	   rationality	   can	  be	  
interpreted	  in	  two	  diametrically	  opposed	  ways	  (further	  details	  can	  be	  found	  in	  Fiori	  2011).	  	  
In	  truth,	  there	  is	  no	  need	  to	  identify	  the	  author	  or	  approach	  most	  faithful	  to	  Simon’s	  vision;	  rather,	  it	  should	  
be	  simply	  recognized,	   following	  Lovejoy,	   that	  specific	   ideas	  are	  used	  by	  different	  approaches.	  As	  a	  result,	  
the	  boundaries	  of	   those	   fields	  and	  studies	   that	  are	  traversed	  by	  such	  concepts	  are	  modified,	  especially	   if	  
ideas	   have	   their	   origins	   in	   other	   disciplines.	   The	   concept	   of	   bounded	   rationality	   originates	   from	   Simon’s	  
studies	  in	  computer	  science	  and	  artificial	  intelligence,	  but	  it	  owes	  its	  fortune	  to	  the	  use	  that	  Simon	  made	  of	  
it	   in	  economics.	   Then,	  however,	   the	  attempt	   to	   recast	   (some	  provinces	  of)	   economics	   itself	  by	  using	   the	  
concept	  has	  been	  made	  by	  specialists	  from	  other	  disciplines,	   like	  psychology	  (Kahneman	  and	  Gigerenzer),	  
philosophy	   (M.	   Polanyi),	   and	   theories	   of	   organization	   (March,	   Williamson,	   Nelson	   and	   Winter).	   The	  
recombination	  of	  ideas	  within	  new	  theoretical	  frameworks	  engenders	  novelty,	  but	  it	  also	  restructures	  the	  
domains	  of	  a	  discipline,	  and	  how	  “internal”	  systems	  of	   thought	  work	   to	  oppose	  each	  other.	  Moreover,	   it	  
engenders	  novelty	  exactly	  by	  doing	  so,	  since	  –	  if	  we	  are	  to	  follow	  Lovejoy	  (1936,	  4)	  –	  “the	  seeming	  novelty	  
of	  many	  a	  system	  is	  due	  solely	  to	  the	  novelty	  of	  the	  application	  or	  arrangement	  of	  the	  old	  elements	  which	  
enter	   into	   it”,	  where	   “the	   elements	   of	   philosophical	   doctrines,	   in	   differing	   logical	   combinations,	   are	   not	  
always	  readily	  recognizable”.	  	  
This	   perspective	   can	  help	   throw	  new	   light	  on	  possible	  dialogue	  among	   schools	   of	   thought	   in	   economics.	  
Sheila	  Dow	  (2004,	  279)	  remarks	  that	  “in	  Kuhn’s	  framework,	  incommensurability	  does	  not	  mean	  an	  absence	  
of	   communication,	   but	   rather	   difficulty	   of	   communication”:	   even	   Kuhn’s	   drastic	   (but	   early,	   see	   below)	  
philosophy	  of	  science	  does	  not	  rule	  out	  the	  possibility	  of	  interchange	  between	  paradigms,	  and	  therefore	  of	  
reciprocal	   criticism.	   Social	   sciences	   live	   prevalently	   in	   a	   condition	   of	   “immature”	   science,	   the	   pre-­‐
paradigmatic	  state,	  to	  use	  Kuhn’s	  expression,	  in	  which	  several	  paradigms	  legitimately	  coexist,	  and	  plurality	  
is	   the	   norm.	   Thus,	   the	   distinction	   between	   normal	   science	   and	   moments	   of	   potential	   (paradigmatic)	  
revolution	   becomes	   blurred	   and,	   despite	   difficult	   translation	   problems,	   it	   “is	   still	   possible	   to	   learn	   other	  
languages	  in	  such	  a	  way	  as	  to	  allow	  communication”.	  Which	  is	  exactly	  “what	  facilitates	  the	  transition	  from	  
one	  paradigm	  to	  the	  next”	  (Dow	  2004,	  287).	   In	  sum,	  considering	  how	  single	  ideas	  can	  (sometimes	  tacitly)	  
move	  from	  one	  school	  of	  thought	  to	  another,	  their	  diversity	  notwithstanding,	  helps	  to	  modify	  the	  view	  of	  
schools	  of	  thought	  as	  monolithic	  structures,	  and	  to	  understand	  the	  shifting	  character	  of	  their	  boundaries.	  
As	  Dow	  herself	  (2008)	  reminds	  us,	  plurality	  (of	  schools	  of	  thought	  and	  approaches)	  does	  not	  (necessarily)	  
mean	   pluralism,	   let	   alone	   advocacy	   of	   pluralism	   –	   if	   we	   accept	   Mäki’s	   (1997,	   39)	   broad	   definition	   of	  
pluralism	  as	  plurality	  plus	  “arguments	  or	  reasons	  for	  plurality”.	  As	  Dutt	   (2014)	  has	  recently	  observed,	  the	  
meaning	   of	   “pluralism”	   in	   economics	   lacks	   clarity.	   Six	   dimensions	   (epistemological,	   ontological,	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methodological,	  normative,	  prescriptive,	  theoretical)	  should	  be	  considered	  in	  order	  to	  define	  the	  distinctive	  
traits	  of	  paradigms,	  and	  to	  distinguish	  among	  them.	  These	  six	  dimensions	  “are	  in	  principle	  independent	  in	  
the	   sense	   that	   choices	   in	  one	  dimension	  do	  not	  necessarily	  dictate	   choices	   in	   any	  of	   the	  others.	  Despite	  
this,	   however,	   a	   choice	   in	  one	  dimension	   can	   in	   fact	   affect	   the	   choice	   in	   another	  one”	   (Dutt	  2014,	  484).	  
More	  pluralism	  in	  one	  dimension	  does	  not	  imply	  more	  pluralism	  in	  other	  dimensions,	  and	  may	  even	  result	  
in	   less	   pluralism.	   Examination	   of	   the	   variety	   of	   levels	   characterizing	   pluralism	   can	   help	   understand	   how	  
ideas	   transmigrate	   from	   one	   theoretical	   context	   to	   another,	   and	   how	   they	   consequently	   assume	   new	  
configurations.	  	  
Following	  Dow	   (2004),	  Dutt	  maintains	   that	   pluralism	   is	   compatible	  with	   adherence	   to	   specific	   schools	   of	  
thought	   exhibiting	   different	   epistemological,	   ontological,	   normative	   and	   prescriptive	   foundations.	   The	  
defence	  of	  pluralism	  involved	  in	  this	  and	  other	  proposals	  implicitly	  borrows	  from	  the	  political-­‐institutional	  
metaphor	  of	  a	  democratic	  republic	  of	  ideas,	  which	  welcomes	  competition	  and	  coexistence	  of	  concepts.	  This	  
metaphor	   also	   implies	   prohibition	   of	   practices	   of	   exclusion	   exerted	   at	   the	   institutional	   level	   against	  
heterodox	   minorities	   (obstacles	   to	   pluralism	   in	   academic	   teaching,	   limitations	   in	   academic	   careers	  
opportunities,	  and	  ostracism	   in	  the	  discipline’s	   journals).	  Yet,	  however	   ideas	  are	  conveyed,	  and	  whatever	  
dimensions	   they	   involve,	   it	   is	   unsurprising	   that	   each	   school	   of	   thought	   advocates	   its	   own	   paradigm	   as	  
superior	   (an	  attitude	  typical	  of	  “first-­‐wave”	  pluralism,	   to	  borrow	  from	  Garnett,	  Olsen	  and	  Starr	  2010).	  As	  
such,	   the	   persistence	   of	   alternative,	   irreducible	   paradigms	   is	   not	   at	   odds	   with	   processes	   that	   involve	  
communication	   and	   contamination	   of	   ideas.	   Pluralism	   thus	   acquires	   also	   an	   ethical	   meaning	   which	   is	  
distinct	  from	  the	  methodological-­‐epistemological	  one	  (see	  Screpanti	  1997,	  306).	  	  
These	  problems	  have	  provoked	  controversies	  among	  supporters	  of	  pluralist	   (and	  heterodox)	  approaches.	  
Lee	   (2011,	   541;	   see	   also	   2012)	   maintains	   that	   “contested	   scientific	   inquiry	   between	   heterodox	   and	  
mainstream	  economics	  does	  exist	   and	   that	   the	  existence	  of	  distinct,	   different,	   and	   conflicting	   theories	   is	  
legitimate	   for	  a	   scientific	  discipline”,	   although	  differences	   should	  be	  dealt	  with	   in	  a	   climate	  of	   tolerance.	  
This	  view	  rejects	  the	   implication	  of	   theoretical	  pluralism,	  advanced	  by	  Colander	  et	  al.	   (2004),	  Sent	  (2006)	  
and	  Garnett	  (2006),	  that	  “contested	  scientific	  inquiry	  should	  not	  exist	  and	  that	  heterodox	  economics	  is	  not	  
a	  distinct	  alternative	  to	  mainstream	  economics”	  (Lee	  2011,	  p.	  541).	  By	  contrast,	  Mearman	  (2011)	  criticizes	  
Lee’s	  conviction	  that	  mainstream	  and	  heterodox	  are	  non-­‐comparable,	  and	  opts	  for	  a	  “structured”	  form	  of	  
pluralism	  (as	  suggested	  by	  Dow	  2004)	  founded	  on	  a	  plurality	  of	  heterodox	  schools	  of	  thought	  that	  segment	  
the	   heterodox	   system	   of	   thought	   along	   lines	   chosen	   to	   understand	   reality	   differently	   or	   throw	   light	   on	  
specific	  different	  aspects	  of	  reality.	  Notably,	  closures	  must	  be	  provisional,	  so	  as	  to	  allow	  cross-­‐fertilization	  
(Dow	  2008).	  Dobusch	  and	  Kapeller	  (2012)	  go	  so	  far	  as	  to	  suggest	  an	  “interested”	  variety	  of	  pluralism	  that	  
requires	  heterodox	  economists	  to	  actively	  engage	  in	  constructing	  a	  pluralist	  conception	  of	  economics	  and	  
in	  practising	  pluralism,	  rather	  than	  contenting	  themselves	  with	  tolerance	  for	  a	  pluralism	  of	  paradigms. 	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Dutt’s	   invitation	  to	  consider	  the	  several	  dimensions	  of	  pluralism	  should	  be	  extended	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	   its	  
past	   and	   recent	   history.	   As	   Morgan	   and	   Rutherford’s	   (1998)	   and	   Bateman’s	   (1998)	   historiographical	  
accounts	   make	   clear,	   pluralism	   characterized	   economic	   theory	   during	   the	   interwar	   period,	   when	  
institutionalism	   and	  neoclassicism	   could	   coexist	  while	   also	   developing	   different	   ‘internal’	   perspectives.	   It	  
was	  only	  after	  World	  War	  II	  that	  tendencies	  toward	  monism	  took	  shape	  with	  the	  decline	  of	  institutionalism.	  
Morgan	  and	  Rutherford	   suggest	   that	   the	   rise	  of	   formalism,	   the	   resulting	  association	  of	  mathematics	  and	  
statistics	  with	  objectivity	  in	  economics,	  and	  consequent	  changes	  in	  academic	  funding,	  etc.,	  played	  a	  major	  
role	  in	  this	  complex	  story.	  
Consideration	  of	  the	  different	  dimensions	  involved	  in	  the	  evolution	  of	  a	  discipline	  implies	  rejection	  both	  of	  
the	  Whig	  historiographical	  view	  of	  progress	  –	  since	  “it	  is	  not	  clear	  that	  the	  evidence	  can	  support	  a	  history	  
that	   neoclassicism	   won	   out	   because	   it	   offered	   better	   theory	   and	   better	   explanations”	   (Morgan	   and	  
Rutherford	   1998,	   24)	   –	   and	   of	   “the	   conspiracy	   theory,	   in	   which	   neoclassical	   economists	   in	   positions	   of	  
power	  ganged	  up	  on	   the	  heterodox”	   (ibid.).	   Extending	  Morgan’s	  and	  Rutherford’s	   reasoning,	   Sent	   (2006,	  
88)	   maintains	   that	   “the	   present	   situation	   in	   (mainstream)	   economics	   may	   be	   characterized	   as	   one	   of	  
moderate	  pluralism”:	  in	  her	  view,	  mainstream	  economics	  has	  failed	  to	  achieve	  monism.	  On	  the	  one	  hand,	  it	  
“has	   no	   notion	   of	   the	   social	   other	   than	   the	   summing	   up	   over	   individuals.	   On	   the	   other	   hand,	   it	   cannot	  
maintain	   a	   unique	   focus	   on	   the	   individual	   because	   this	   would	   preclude	   complete	   explanation	   of	  
competitive	  markets.	  At	  the	  same	  time,	  microeconomic	  findings	  concerning	  the	  individual	  were	  shown	  not	  
to	  carry	  over	  to	  the	  social	  level,	  as	  illustrated	  by	  the	  Sonnenschein-­‐Debreu-­‐Mantel	  result”	  (Sent	  2006,	  93).	  	  
Lee	  (2011)	  connects	  Sent’s	  view	  to	  Colander,	  Holt	  and	  Rosser’s	  (2004)	  reflections	  on	  what	  we	  may	  call	  the	  
shifting	  boundaries	  of	  mainstream	  economics.	  They	  distinguish	  between	  orthodoxy	  (the	  –	  once	  –	  dominant	  
school	  of	  thought	  of	  neoclassical	  economics)	  and	  mainstream	  economics,	  this	  latter	  referring	  to	  “ideas	  that	  
are	   held	   by	   those	   individuals	   who	   are	   dominant	   in	   the	   leading	   academic	   institutions,	   organizations	   and	  
journals”	   (Colander	   et	   al.	   490).	   Here,	   “heterodoxy”	   denotes	   approaches	   which	   develop	   outside	   the	  
mainstream.	  But	  Colander	  et	  al.	  direct	  attention	  to	  the	  work	  of	  influential	  economists	  who	  are	  critics	  of	  the	  
orthodoxy	  despite	  belonging	  to	  the	  mainstream.	  The	  “edge	  of	  economics”	  would	  thus	  consist	  of	  “that	  part	  
of	  mainstream	  economics	  that	  is	  critical	  of	  orthodoxy,	  and	  that	  part	  of	  heterodox	  economics	  that	  is	  taken	  
seriously	  by	  the	  elite	  of	  the	  profession”	  (492).	  In	  this	  perspective,	  mainstream	  economics	  is	  a	  complex	  and	  
dynamic	   system	  of	  evolving	   ideas	  whose	   frontiers	  are	  moveable.	  The	  acceptance	   into	   the	  mainstream	  of	  
approaches	   (non-­‐linear	   dynamics,	   simulations	   and	   agent-­‐based	   models)	   that	   expressly	   challenge	   the	  
traditional	  concepts	  of	  rationality,	  selfishness,	  and	  equilibrium	  is	  contributing	  to	  modifying	  the	  conceptual	  
horizon	  of	  economics.	  	  
Conflicts	   between	   paradigms,	   or	   alternative	   research	   programmes,	   are	   in	   any	   case	   destined	   to	   remain,	  
despite	   economics’	   openness	   to	   new	   ideas	   that	   may	   produce	   a	   change	   in	   its	   structure	   over	   time.	   This	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situation	   becomes	   apparent	   both	   in	   complexity	   economics,	   which	   induces	   to	   rephrase	   the	   concept	   of	  
equilibrium,	   and	   in	   experimental	   economics,	  which	   “suggests	   that	   the	  entire	   approach	   to	   thinking	   about	  
the	  appropriate	  mix	  of	  induction	  and	  deduction	  needs	  to	  be	  rethought”	  (Colander	  et	  al.	  	  2004,	  494).	  	  
Davis	  (2006)	  labels	  “mainstream	  pluralism”	  the	  co-­‐presence	  of	  a	  variety	  of	  research	  programmes	  in	  today’s	  
mainstream	  economics	  that	  significantly	  deviate	  from	  the	  neoclassical	  core,	  are	  pursued	  by	  different,	  often	  
separate	  communities	  of	  researchers,	  and	  have	  their	  origins	  outside	  economics.	  Such	  pluralism	  induces	  one	  
to	  wonder	  whether	  a	  new	  period	  of	  dominance	  can	  follow,	  since	  historically,	  Davis	  (2008)	  argues,	  pluralism	  
and	  monism	  have	  been	  the	  two	  phases	  of	  a	  cycle,	   in	  which	  the	  new,	  monistic,	  mainstream	  emerges	  from	  
the	  struggle,	  in	  the	  pluralistic	  phase,	  between	  alternative	  candidates	  to	  dominance.	  In	  an	  age	  of	  “reverse”	  
imperialisms,	   the	  outside-­‐economics	  origins	  of	  many	  of	   the	   research	  programmes	  of	   today’s	  mainstream	  
pluralism	  are	  likely	  to	  have	  a	  not	  negligible	  impact	  on	  the	  future	  configuration	  of	  the	  discipline.	  Important	  
hints	   in	   this	   regard	   are	   offered	   by	   the	   recent	   history	   of	   behavioral	   development	   economics	   (that	   is,	   the	  
application	  of	  the	  insights	  and	  methods	  of	  behavioral	  economics	  to	  the	  analysis	  of	  development	  issues,	  see	  
Davis	   2013).	   This	   is	   a	   field	   that	   –	   owing	   its	   existence	   to	   the	   incursion	   of	   psychology	   into	   economics	   –	   is	  
currently	   impressing	   an	   imperialist	   turn	   on	   development	   economics.	   The	   selective	   appropriation	   of	  
Kahneman-­‐Tversky	   heuristics	   and	   the	   progressive	   marginalization	   of	   Gigerenzer’s	   and	   the	   ABC	   group’s	  
ecological	   rationality	   is	   functional	   to	   recasting	  non-­‐market	  dimensions	   in	   terms	  of	  behavioral	   economics,	  
while	   imposing	  the	  “social	  and	  cultural	   imperialism”	  of	  “its	  utility	   theory-­‐based	  policy	   recommendations”	  
(and	  therefore,	  the	  economic	  values	  of	   liberal	  society)	  on	  developing	  countries.	  The	  outcome	  contains	  an	  
important	  novelty	  with	  respect	  to	  Gary	  Becker’s	  old-­‐style	  economic	  imperialism:	  “If	  that	  imperialism	  was	  an	  
inherently	  difficult	  project	  in	  virtue	  of	  needing	  to	  impose	  a	  foreign	  content	  on	  the	  other	  science	  domains	  to	  
which	  economics	  was	  being	  applied,	  by	  contrast	  a	  behavioral	  economics	  imperialism	  seems	  to	  be	  a	  project	  
with	   a	   reasonable	   prospect	   of	   succeeding	   because	   it	   brings	   an	   originally	   non-­‐economic	   content	   (from	  
psychology)	   to	  bear	   on	  whatever	   science	  domain	   to	  which	   it	   is	   applied	   –	   albeit	   after	   that	   non-­‐economic	  
content	  has	  been	  reframed	  as	  ‘economic’”	  (Davis	  2013,	  130-­‐1).	  
Davis’s	   argument	   has	   some	   points	   of	   contact	   with	   Fine	   and	  Milonakis’s	   (2009)	   reasoning	   on	   the	   “new”	  
forms	  of	   economics	   imperialism	   stemming	   from	   the	  development	  of	   the	   information-­‐theoretic	   approach	  
since	  the	  1970s.	  In	  general,	  however,	  one	  could	  say	  that	  the	  metaphor	  of	  “shifting	  boundaries”,	  invoked	  by	  
Fine	  and	  Milonakis	  to	  represent	  the	  results	  of	  economics’	  pugilistic	  attitude	  towards	  other	  social	  sciences,	  
can	   in	   truth	   be	   taken	   as	   the	   general	   rule	   for	   the	   discipline	   itself,	   in	   an	   age	   of	   fragmentation	   –	   perhaps	  
without	   drawing	   a	   (too	   strong)	   distinction	   between	   the	   internal	   and	   the	   external	   dimension.	   The	   recent	  
debate	   on	   the	   plurality	   and	   pluralism	   of	   (mainstream)	   economics	   illustrates,	   in	   the	   end,	   how	   frontiers	  
among	  schools	  of	  thought	  can	  be	  redefined,	  how	  ideas	  move	  from	  one	  discipline	  to	  another,	  but	  also	  how	  
the	  mainstream	  of	  economics	  can	  lose	  compactness	  under	  the	  weight	  of	  the	  various	  re-­‐conceptualizations	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of	   ideas,	   often	   culminating	   in	   the	   development	   of	   views	   that	   are	   (even	   radically)	   alternative	   to	   the	  
established	  ones,	  which	  accompany	  such	  processes.	  	  	  
One	   of	   the	   tacit	   dimensions	   of	   pluralism	   is	   fragmentation	   (see	   Cedrini	   and	   Fontana	   2016).	   Mainstream	  
pluralism	   is	   (also)	   evidence	   of	   the	   fact	   that	   economics	   has	   become	   that	   “fragmented	   world	   of	  
specialization”	  to	  which	  John	  Pencavel	  referred	   in	  1991	  (85)	  while	  trying	  to	  guess	  the	  future	  evolution	  of	  
the	  discipline.	  The	   then	  editor	  of	   the	   Journal	  of	  Economic	   Literature	  was	  well	   aware	   that	  economics	  was	  
becoming	   a	   highly	   specialised	   discipline,	   and	   that	   this	   was,	   to	   quote	   Turnovski	   (1991,	   143),	   an	   almost	  
“inevitable	  consequence	  of	  the	  maturing	  of	  economics”.	  Pencavel	  (1991,	  86)	  foresaw	  that	  future	  scholars	  
would	  be	  “well	  versed	  in	  ongoing	  research”	  only	  within	  their	  specific	  subarea	  of	  specialization,	  compelling	  
the	   profession	   to	   “assume	   a	   more	   pluralistic	   character”.	   Specialization	   (better,	   the	   new	   heights	   it	   has	  
reached)	  perhaps	  represents	  the	  most	  evident	  symptom	  of	  the	  blurring,	  which	  it	  somehow	  presupposes,	  of	  
the	   concept	   itself	   of	   boundaries	   in	   today’s	   economics,	   while	   at	   the	   same	   time	   de-­‐emphasizing	   their	  
importance	  by	  promoting	  a	  conception	  of	  scientific	  progress	  that	  essentially	  builds	  on	  local	  knowledge.	  The	  
“late”	  Kuhn	  (see	  Cedrini	  and	  Fontana	  2016,	  and	  the	  bibliography	  there	  cited),	  in	  effect,	  saw	  specialization	  –	  
rather	   than	   scientific	   revolutions	   –	   as	   the	   main	   engine	   of	   scientific	   progress.	   Mainstream	   pluralism	   in	  
economics	   is	   also	   the	   result	   of	   the	   power	   of	   the	   self-­‐reinforcing	   strategy	   of	   narrowing	   expertise	   when	  
facing	   the	   otherwise	   insurmountable	   problem	   of	   the	   burden	   of	   accumulated	   knowledge.	   To	   innovate,	  
researchers	  have	  to	  reach	  the	  frontier,	  but	  the	  “necessity”	  of	  specialization	  boosts	  a	  continuous	  process	  of	  
niches-­‐creation,	  where	  specialized	  economists	  are	   free	   to	  develop	  conceptual	   innovation	   in	  conditions	  of	  
relative	   insulation	   both	   from	   the	   orthodox	   core	   of	   the	   discipline	   and	   without	   interference	   from	   other	  
subfields	   in	  economics.	   It	   is	  here,	  at	   the	  niche	   level,	  however,	   that	  economists	  meet	   (and	  necessarily	   so)	  
specialists	   from	   other	   disciplines	   and	   selectively	   incorporate	   concepts	   from	   these	   latter.	  With	   the	   result	  
that	  the	  relationships	  (not	  to	  speak	  of	  the	  boundaries)	  between	  disciplines	  are	  continuously	  redefined.	  
Finally,	   it	   is	  worth	  mentioning	   that	  metaphors	  and	  analogies	  occupy	  a	   role	  of	  primary	   importance	   in	   the	  
processes	  redefining	  the	  boundaries	  among	  disciplines	  or	  subfields	  and	  schools	  of	  thought.	  They	  operate	  by	  
exploring	   unknown	   domains	   in	   light	   of	   the	   properties	   of	   known	   realms,	   thereby	   reorganizing	   our	  
conceptual	  horizons,	  as	  Black’s	  (1962)	  “interaction	  view”	  has	  clarified.	  Metaphors	  do	  not	  make	  preexisting	  
similarities	  explicit:	  rather,	  they	  create	  new	  ones,	  and	  “play	  an	  essential	  role	  even	  in	  mature	  fields,	   in	  the	  
development	  of	  new	  theories	  as	  well	  as	  in	  the	  extension	  of	  old	  ones”	  (Bicchieri	  1988,	  104).	  For	  this	  reason,	  
they	  are	  constitutive	  of	  theory	  (Boyd	  1993).	  Various	  authors,	  for	  instance	  Hesse,	  Kuhn,	  Boyd,	  Bailer-­‐Jones,	  
have	   argued	   that	   scientific	   models	   work	   as	   metaphorical	   redescriptions	   because	   they	   create	   new	  
similarities	  on	  the	  bases	  of	  analogies.	  Metaphors	  and	  analogies	  have	  characterized	  economic	  inquiry	  since	  
the	   dawn	   of	   the	   discipline.	   The	   metaphor	   of	   the	   invisible	   hand	   allowed	   Adam	   Smith	   to	   explore	   the	  
dynamics	   by	   which	   order	   is	   achieved	   in	   the	   market.	   Modern	   neoclassical	   theory	   was	   dominated	   by	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analogies	   and	   homologies	   borrowed	   from	   rational	   mechanics	   (Mirowski	   1989,	   Cohen	   1994),	   while	  
evolutionary	   approaches	   resorted	   to	   biological	  metaphors	   (Hodgson	   1999,	   60-­‐126).	   In	   short,	   metaphors	  
reveal	  that	  some	  tacit	  or	  even	  unconscious	  but	  powerful	  mechanisms	  are	  continuously	  at	  work	  below	  the	  
surface	   to	   redefine	   the	   frontiers	   of	   disciplines,	   while	   determining	   criteria	   of	   relevance	   and	   structuring	  
scientific	  discourses.	  
	  
This	  volume	  collects	  eight	  contributions	  presented	  at	  the	  2015	  STOREP	  Annual	  Conference.	  The	  presidential	  
address	  and	   three	  keynote	   lectures	  are	   followed	  by	   four	  papers	  selected	   from	  among	  those	  discussed	  at	  
the	   conference.	   The	   feature	   shared	   by	   the	   papers	   is	   their	   reflection	   on	   the	   shifting	   boundaries	   of	  
economics	   (focusing	   on	   concepts	   like	   economics	   imperialism,	   paradigms	   in	   economics,	   pluralism	   and	  
interdisciplinarity)	  in	  a	  historical	  perspective,	  with	  particular	  regard	  to	  their	  connection	  with	  liberalism	  and	  
neoliberalism.	   An	   implicit	   assumption	   behind	   this	   special	   issue	   is	   that,	   by	   accepting	   the	   challenge	   and	  
responsibility	  of	  exploring	  the	  current	  era	  of	   fragmentation,	  the	  history	  of	  economic	  thought	  can	  provide	  
the	  theoretical	  ‘glue’	  required	  for	  the	  analysis	  of	  economics	  in	  a	  post-­‐foundational	  phase.	  
This	  is	  one	  of	  the	  reasons	  why	  the	  issue	  opens	  with	  Maria	  Cristina	  Marcuzzo	  (STOREP	  President)	  and	  Giulia	  
Zacchia’s	  quantitative-­‐in-­‐nature	  (and	  positive	  rather	  than	  normative)	  examination	  of	  the	  work	  of	  historians	  
of	  economic	  thought,	   illustrating	  trends	  and	  tendencies	  which	  have	  developed	  in	  the	  last	  twenty	  years	  or	  
so.	   In	  general,	   it	  seems	  fair	   to	  point	  out	  that	  the	  history	  of	  economic	  thought	   is	  not	  enjoying	  a	   favorable	  
moment:	  Marcuzzo	  and	  Zacchia	  find	  evidence	  of	  the	  concentration	  of	  history-­‐of-­‐economic-­‐thought	  articles	  
in	  a	  very	   small	   set	  of	   specialized	   journals,	  with	  a	  general	   strengthening	  of	   the	  boundaries	   separating	   the	  
historical	   analysis	   on	   evolving	   ideas	   in	   the	   discipline	   from	   what	   economists	   do.	   Three	   more	   specific,	  
interrelated	   tendencies	   in	   the	  history	  of	   economic	   thought	   emerge	   from	   the	   investigation.	   First,	   a	  move	  
towards	   inquiries	   into	  “minor”	   figures	  and/or	  economists	   from	  a	  more	  recent	  past.	  Second,	  a	  preference	  
for	  archival	  research	  on	  correspondence	  and	  unpublished	  material.	  Third,	  a	  tendency	  to	  substitute	  research	  
on	  individual	  authors	  with	  investigations	  attempting	  to	  uncover	  networks,	  and	  to	  trace	  the	  links	  between	  
intellectual	  circles.	  
Still,	  as	  said,	  the	  history	  of	  economic	  thought	  may	  be	  destined	  to	  recover	  a	  more	  central	  position	  in	  a	  less	  
and	   less	  unified	  discipline	   like	   today’s	  economics.	  For	   instance,	  as	  Alan	  Kirman	  shows	   in	   this	   issue,	   it	   can	  
help	   throw	   light	   on	   the	   deep-­‐lying	   reasons	   for	   its	   recent	   failures	   by	   examining	   some	   of	   the	   unjustified	  
claims	  that	  continue	  to	  impair	  the	  validity	  of	  modern	  orthodox	  economic	  theory.	  Kirman’s	  critique	  points	  at	  
this	   latter’s	   inability	   to	   provide	   a	   formal	   justification	   for	   the	   fundamental	   idea	   that	   the	   invisible	   hand	  
mechanism	   leads	   society	   to	   a	   desirable	   state	   by	   harmonizing	   individual	   and	   social	   interests.	   This	  
assumption	  –	  which	  is	  also	  the	  one	  upon	  which	  social	  and	  political	  liberalism	  was	  erected	  –	  tells	  us	  nothing	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about	  how	  such	  a	  state	  is	  attained.	  Erroneously	  built	  upon	  a	  conception	  of	  society	  as	  a	  collection	  of	  isolated	  
individuals,	  the	  Walrasian	  tradition	  has	  proved	  simply	  unable	  to	  demonstrate	  the	  stability	  and	  uniqueness	  
of	  general	  equilibrium,	  as	  the	  famous	  Sonnenschein-­‐Debreu-­‐Mantel	  result	  shows.	  Likewise,	  the	  hypothesis	  
of	   rational	   expectations	   is	   vitiated	  by	   the	   idea	   that	   individuals’	   expectations	   can	  be	  dealt	  with	   as	   if	   they	  
were	  those	  of	  one	  individual.	  Kirman	  here	  casts	  serious	  doubts	  on	  the	  “cornerstone	  of	  the	  justifications	  for	  
socio-­‐economic	  liberalism”	  –	  i.e.	  that	  in	  the	  presence	  of	  appropriate	  incentives	  an	  economy	  self-­‐organizes	  
in	   a	   socially	   correct	   way	   –	   and	   illustrates	   the	   potential	   disclosed	   by	   considering	   economies	   as	   complex	  
adaptive	  systems.	  	  
In	  this	  regard,	  Kirman	  argues,	  economics	  has	  much	  to	  gain	  from	  other	  sciences.	  But	  the	  story	  of	  economics’	  
relationships	  with	  other	  disciplines,	  and	  particularly	  social	  sciences,	  is	  a	  troubled	  one.	  In	  his	  essay,	  John	  B.	  
Davis	   suggests	   a	   distinction	   between	   “interdisciplinarity”,	   which	   supports	   a	   conception	   of	   sciences	   as	  
relatively	  autonomous	  from	  one	  another,	  and	  “multidisciplinarity”,	  which	  he	  associates	  with	  the	  idea	  that	  
the	  sciences	  can	  have	  reciprocal	  transformative	  effects	  on	  one	  another.	  Davis	  focuses	  on	  Edward	  Lazear’s	  
(2000)	   now	   classic	   article	   on	   economics	   imperialism,	   and	   aptly	   reconstructs	   the	   context	   in	  which	   Lazear	  
proposed	   his	   defense	   of	   economics’	   pugilistic	   attitude	   towards	   other	   social	   sciences,	   and	   the	   strategic	  
reasons	   for	   this	   defense.	   While	   employing	   a	   trade	   theory	   to	   explain	   economics’	   success	   in	   terms	   of	  
comparative	  advantages,	  Lazear	  adopts	  an	  “interdisciplinarity”	  view	  of	  sciences,	  but	  does	  so	  in	  a	  context	  of	  
(with	   the	   aim	   to	   oppose)	   reverse	   imperialisms,	   in	   the	   awareness	   that	   sciences	   may	   indeed	   have	  
transformative	  effects	  on	  one	  another.	  Caught	   in	  the	   impasse,	  Chicago	  school	  neoclassicism	  has	  only	  one	  
exit	  strategy	  available,	  Davis	  claims:	  that	  of	  evolving	  a	  new	  strategy	  that	  ultimately	  extends	  the	  economics	  
imperialism	   program	   (as	   against	   the	   possibility	   of	   pluralism)	   by	   fostering	   a	   performative	   conception	   of	  
neoclassicism	  itself	  as	  a	  theory	  that	  sees	  the	  world	  in	  its	  own	  image	  or	  as	  a	  mirror	  of	  itself.	  
One	  might	  add	  that	  neoliberalism	  adopts	  a	  not	  dissimilar	  strategy,	  or	  even	  that	  it	  adopts	  an	  even	  more	  
radical	  performative	  approach.	  Liberalism	  and	  neoliberalism	  are	  the	  focal	  points	  of	  the	  next	  two	  articles	  of	  
the	   issue.	   In	  his	   invited	   talk,	  Viktor	   J.	  Vanberg	  discusses	  Hayek’s	   (and	  Buchanan’s)	   legacy,	   starting	   from	  a	  
critique	  of	  the	  “cognitive”	  assumption	  of	  rational	  choice	  theory	  –	  the	   idea	  that	   individuals	  are	  cognitively	  
able	   to	   identify	   in	   every	   situation	   the	   course	   of	   action	   that	   will	   work	   out	   best	   for	   them.	   In	   particular,	  
Vanberg	  concentrates	  on	  one	  of	  the	  main	  issues	  at	  stake	  in	  today’s	  Europe	  –	  the	  role	  of	  rules	  as	  tools	  for	  
governing	  –	  borrowing	  from	  Hayek	  the	  idea	  that	  complexity	  is	  a	  real	  and	  binding	  constraint	  on	  our	  ability	  to	  
shape	  a	  desirable	  order	  by	  discretionary	   interventions.	  To	  discuss	  politics	   in	   its	  quality	  of	  a	  tool	   for	  social	  
coordination,	   Hayek’s	   view	   is	   complemented	   by	   Buchanan’s	   “constitutional	   political	   economy”	   approach	  
and	   by	   the	   ordoliberalism	   of	   the	   Freiburg	   school.	   These	   approaches	   share	   the	   idea	   that	   the	   main	  
instrument	  with	  which	  to	  correct	   the	   inadequacies	  of	  economic	  systems	  consists	   in	  changing	  the	  rules	  of	  
the	  game,	  and	  not	  in	  adopting	  arbitrary	  interventions.	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Ordoliberalism	   is	   also	   dealt	   with	   in	   Ceyhun	   Gürkan’s	   article,	   within	   broader	   analysis	   of	   Foucault’s	  
“history	   of	   governmentality”,	   the	   long	   and	   complex	   historical	   process	   in	   which	   a	   general	   economy	   of	  
(exercising)	   power	   has	   been	   established	   since	   the	   beginning	   of	   the	   sixteenth	   century.	   Foucault’s	  
perspective	   serves	   here	   as	   the	   required	   theoretical	   bridge	   from	   classical	   liberalism,	   as	  modified	   by	   early	  
neoclassical	   economics,	   to	   neoliberalism,	   with	   the	   aim	   of	   deepening	   the	   understanding	   of	   the	   peculiar	  
connection,	  in	  particular,	  between	  neoclassical	  economics	  and	  neoliberalism,	  and	  not	  only	  as	  theories.	  The	  
fundamental	   break	   between	   the	   “naive	   naturalism”	   (Foucault	   2008,	   120)	   of	   classical	   liberalism	   and	   the	  
“active	   policy”	   (2008,	   120)	   of	   neoliberalism	   is	   in	   fact	   to	   be	   understood,	   Gurkan	   argues,	   in	   terms	   of	  
governmentality:	  that	  is,	  as	  the	  passage	  from	  the	  idea	  of	  governing	  because	  of	  the	  market	  to	  governing	  for	  
the	   market.	   This	   requires	   going	   with	   Foucault	   beyond	   Foucault	   himself,	   paying	   especial	   attention	   to	  
neoclassical	   economics	   and	   its	   governmentality,	   as	   well	   as	   to	   the	   intimate	   connections	   among	   power,	  
government	  and	  knowledge	  on	  which	  concepts	  like	  economics	  imperialism	  rest.	  	  
Fernando	   Chafim’s	   article	   adopts	   a	   philosophy-­‐of-­‐science	   perspective	   to	   deal	   with	   the	   relationships	  
between	  economics	  and	  other	  social	  sciences.	  The	  focus	   is	  here	  on	  hybridization,	  a	  process	  by	  which	  the	  
boundaries	   among	   sciences	   (particularly	   social	   sciences)	   shift,	   and	   concepts,	   theories,	   methods	   are	  
continuously	   fragmented	   and	   recombined.	   A	   quite	   normal	   process,	   and	   an	   important	   driver	   of	   scientific	  
knowledge,	   hybridization	   is	   here	   shown	   to	   have	   played	   an	   important	   part	   in	   the	   case	   (however	  
counterintuitive	  this	  may	  appear	  prima	  facie)	  of	  economics	  imperialism,	  today’s	  “mainstream	  pluralism”,	  as	  
well	  as	  heterodox	  economics,	  yielding	  interesting	  results,	  and	  more	  generally	  outlining	  a	  perspective	  (which	  
involves	  changes	  in	  the	  relationships	  with	  other	  disciplines),	  for	  pluralism	  in	  economics.	  
Two	  essays	  in	  economic	  methodology	  and	  epistemology,	  both	  adopting	  an	  historical	  perspective,	  bring	  
the	  issue	  to	  a	  close.	  Irène	  Berthonnet	  provides	  an	  intriguing	  perspective	  on	  how	  key	  concepts	  in	  economics	  
might	   evolve	   over	   time,	   undergo	   transformations,	   and	   be	   the	   object	   of	   collective	   appropriations.	  
Berthonnet	  reconstructs,	   in	  particular,	  how	  the	  meaning	  of	  Pareto’s	  concept	  of	  “maximum	  of	  ophelimity”	  
(which	  we	   tend	   to	   associate,	   in	  modern	   jargon,	  with	   “Pareto-­‐efficiency”)	   changed	  over	   time.	  Pareto	  was	  
unclear	   in	   specifying	   whether	   the	   theoretical	   place	   of	   this	   notion	   was	   to	   be	   positive	   or	   normative	  
economics:	  this	  hesitation	  is	  at	  the	  origins	  of	  a	  century	  of	  debates	  on	  the	  normative	  or	  positive	  essence	  of	  
the	   notion,	   and	   therefore	   the	   use	   to	   be	  made	   of	   it.	  While	   welfare	   economics,	   by	   introducing	   the	   term	  
“optimum”,	   privileged	   the	   normative	   view,	   Allais,	   Arrow	   and	   Hahn	   (who	   used	   the	   expression	   “Pareto-­‐
efficiency”)	  opted	   for	  a	  characterization	  of	   this	   concept	  as	  a	  descriptive,	  not	  prescriptive,	  qualification	  of	  
specific	  types	  of	  general	  equilibria.	  The	  quantitative	  and	  lexical	  analysis	  presented	  in	  the	  article	  shows	  that,	  
in	  recent	  decades,	  a	  general	  tendency	  to	  adopt	  the	  concept	  of	  Pareto-­‐efficiency	  instead	  of	  that	  of	  Pareto-­‐
optimality	  has	  clearly	  emerged.	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Paolo	  Silvestri’s	  article	  is	  an	  attempt	  to	  understand	  the	  nature	  of	  the	  academic	  discourse	  that	  seeks	  to	  
found,	  demarcate	  or	  defend	   the	  autonomy	  or	   the	  boundaries	  of	  a	  discipline,	  and	   to	  explore	   the	   reasons	  
why	   this	  discourse	   sometimes	   turns	   into	  dogmatic-­‐excommunicating	  wrangles	  among	  disciplines,	   schools	  
or	  scholars.	  If	  an	  interpretative	  framework	  that	  rests	  on	  the	  analogy	  between	  institutions	  and	  disciplines	  as	  
dogmatic	  systems	  is	  used,	  scholars’	  discourse	  can	  be	  understood	  both	  as	  a	  discourse	  on	  the	  legitimacy	  of	  
their	   own	  disciplines,	   and	   as	   a	   self-­‐legitimizing	  discourse.	   This	   is	   shown	   to	   raise	   an	   issue	  of	   the	   identity-­‐
legitimacy	  of	  the	  scholar	  qua	  scholar:	  dogmatism	  and	  the	  resulting	  excommunication	  (keeping	  outside	  the	  
borders)	  are,	  in	  fact,	  also	  a	  function	  of	  the	  degree	  of	  identity	  between	  scholars	  and	  the	  disciplines	  that	  they	  
practice.	   The	   article	   explores	   the	   issue	   of	   disciplinary	   boundaries	   by	   reexamining	   Pareto’s,	   Croce’s,	   and	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